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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
DALE ANDERSON, ] 
Plaintiff and Appellee, ] 
vs. ] 
ROBERT S. F ARR and D. ARON ] 
STANTON, ] 
Defendants and Appellants. ] 
> APPELLANT D. ARON STANTON'S 
) PETITION FOR REHEARING IN RE: 
) MEMORANDUM DECISION FILED 
) 9 DECEMBER 1999 (1999 UT APP 367) 
I AND REQUEST FOR ANSWER 
| Case No. 981779 CA 
> District Docket No. 89-090-7678 
) Circuit Docket No. 94-0014634 
| Circuit Docket No. 94-00013022 
PETITION OF APPELLANT 
ON APPEAL FROM A FINAL JUDGMENT BEFORE THE 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT, MURRAY DEPARTMENT 
DANIEL A. STANTON, #3077 
D. ARON STANTON, P. C. 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
1450 East Highland Cove Lane, Suite 310 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Telephone: (801) 424-3570 
DAVID C. ANDERSON 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee 
505 East 200 South, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 533-9400 
Dated: 6 January 2000 
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DANIEL A. STANTON, #3077 
ARON STANTON, P. C, 
Attorney for Petitioner 
1450 East Highland Cove Lane 
Suite #310 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Tel: (801) 424-3570 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
DALE ANDERSON, ) 
Plaintiff - Appellee - Respondent ) 
vs. ] 
ROBERT S. FARR and D. ARON ] 
STANTON, ; 
Defendants - Appellants ] 
D. ARON STANTON, ] 
Petitioner. ) 
) APPELLANT D. ARON STANTON'S 
) PETITION FOR REHEARING IN RE: 
) MEMORANDUM DECISION FILED 
) 9 DECEMBER 1999 (1999 UT APP 367) 
| AND REQUEST FOR ANSWER 
l Case No. 981779 CA 
I District No. 89-0907678 
1 Circuit No. 94-0014634 
) Circuit No. 94-0013022 
COMES NOW Petitioner in the above-styled matter, D. Aron Stanton, pro se 
("Stanton'7), pursuant to Rule 35(a), UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDLIRE ("URAP"), and 
within the time specially graitted by this Court therefor, submits his Petition for Rehearing 
and Request for Answer, certifying hereby that this petition is presented in good faith and 
not for any purpose of delay. As grounds herefor, Stanton shows as follows: 
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POINTS OF FACT AND LAW OVERLOOKED OR 
MISAPPREHENDED BY THIS COURT ON APPEAL 
1. In the above-captioned Memorandum Decision filed in the instant appeal on 
9 December 1999, this Court, not unlike the courts below in the various decisions and 
orders heretofore rendered in this case during the course of the past decade, also overlooks 
or misapprehends the underlying and inherently-fatal jurisdictional defect which arose 
from the fact that it was involuntarily dismissed without prejudice on 31 August 1990 and 
was never subsequently refiled or otherwise reinstituted by Plaintiff Anderson following 
that dismissal. 
2. In light of this evidentiary fact it is clear that, from on and after 31 August 
1990 there was no longer any viable case or controversy in existence and nothing in the 
record extant in this case may be shown to the contrary, much less be argued with legal 
sufficiency enough to overcome this inherent jurisdictional impediment 
3. Because the instant Memorandum Decision of this Court did not touch upon 
the core issue of subject matter jurisdiction in this appeal to any great extent, and because 
it is well-settled law and familiar doctrine in American jurisprudence that subject matter 
jurisdiction may be raised at any time and at any stage of proceedings, and because any 
judgment rendered in the absence of jurisdiction is void and constitutes a denial of due 
process under both state and federal constitutions (as occurred in the courts below in this 
case), it is, therefore, both timely and proper to submit this petition for rehearing in order 
to reinvite and focus the Court's attention to that specific issue for the purpose of obtaining 
its fully-informed decision correcting that fundamental error of the courts below. 
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4. "Controlling Utah case law teaches that 'correctness' means the appellate 
court decided the matter for itself and does not defer in any degree to the trial judge's 
determination of kw/ ' Statev.Pena. 869 R2d 932,936 (Utah, 1994); Howell v. Howell 806 
R2d 1209,1211 {Utah App.), cert denied 817 R2d 325 (Utah, 1991); Smith v. Smith. 793 
P.2d 407, 409 (Ut.Ct Appv 1990). "This is so because appellate courts have traditionally 
been seen as having the power and duty to say what the lav/ is and to ensure that it is 
uniform throughout the jurisdiction/' Petia. supra, 869 R2d, at 936 {citing Charles Alan 
Wright, Tite Doubtful Omniscience of Appellate Courts, 41 Minn. L. Rev. 751, 779 (1957); 
see also: State v. Thurman. 846 P.2d 1256,1266 (Utah, 1993). As to whether a court has 
subject matter jurisdiction, see: Rimensburger v« Rimensburger, 841 R2d 709, 710 
(Ut.Ct.App,, 1992); Van DerStappen v. Van Per Stappen. 815 R2d 1335,1337 (Ut.Ct App., 
1991). 
5. In Ritnensburger. supra, this Court said, "The question of whether a court has 
subject matter jurisdiction 'goes to the very power of a court to entertain an action/ Curtis 
v. Curtis. 789 R2d 717, 726 (Ut. App.1990). Consequently, we review this question of law 
independently and do not defer to the trial court (cites omitted)." Ibid. In Van Per 
Stappen, supra, this Court also made it clear that, "...[a] judgment is void when entered by 
a court that lacks subject matter jurisdiction/' Ibid. "...Furthermore, subject matter 
jurisdiction cannot be conferred upon a court by consent or waiver, and a judgment can 
be attacked for lack of subject matter jurisdiction at any time. Thompson v. Jackson, 743 
?2d 1230, 1232 (UtApp.1987)/' Id. "Finally, the question of whether subject matter 
jurisdiction exists is one of law, and die determination of whether to set aside a judgment 
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for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is reviewed without deference to the trial court. State 
Dept of Social Services v. Vifil 784 R2d 1130,1132 (Utah, 1989)." Id 
6. The facts in this case relevant to this petition demonstrate that Plaintiff Dale 
Anderson (herein Plaintiff Anderson), by and through his attorney, David C. Anderson 
(herein Attorney Anderson), filed his complaint in Third District Court, Hon. Kenneth 
Rigtrup, J., on 22 December 1989 as against Defendants Robert S. f arr (Farr) and Stanton, 
7. The complaint alleged a 20 March 1987 default on a contract and was thus 
subject to the Utah six (6)-year statute of limitations governing contract actions which, in 
this case, expired on 20 March 1993. 
8. On 17 July 1990, nearly seven (7) months after the filing of the complaint, the 
District Court, on its own motion, issued an Order to Show Cause (OSC) which ordered 
the parties to appear at a hearing scheduled for 24 August 1990 and show cause why this 
case should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute. The OSC concludes with the 
statement: "Failure to appear will be considered aquiescence [sic} in entry of an order of 
dismissal without further notice/' 
9. None of the parties appeared at the OSC hearing l and as a predictable 
consequence the court routinely issued an order of involuntary dismissal, without 
prejudice, on the date scheduled for hearing, which order wras subsequently filed on 31 
It is undisputed that while Stanton did not receive a copy of the 17 July 1990 
notice, see: Appellee's Answer Brief, at 19, e9g., "(the Appellant bad not received notice of 
the hearing according to the Certificate of Mailing)/' Anderson was served a copy. See: 
Appellee's Answering Brief, at 11, J^ 4, e.g>, "This was served by mail on counsel of record 
but not to Appellant [Stanton], according to its certificate of service/' 
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August 1990. See: District docket sheet, Order to Show Cause (K. E.,2 at 19-20) and Order 
of Dismissal (R. E., at 21). (A copy of each are attached for the Court's convenience as 
Exhibits 1 - 3.) 
10. Under these facts the propriety of the dismissal cannot be deemed an error 
or even seriously questioned because, as the Utah Supreme Court has often stated: "In 
dismissing an action for want of prosecution, the court may proceed under [Rule 41(b)}, 
or it may, of its own motion, take action to that end/ ' Brasher Motor and Finance Co, y^ 
Brown, 23 Utah 2d 247,461 P<2d 464,464-65 (1969), cited with approval in Charlie Brown 
Construction Co.. Inc., v. Leisure Sports Incorporated. 740 P.2d 1368,1370 (Ut.Ct.App., 
1987), cert, denied. 765 P»2d 1277 (Utah, 1987) ("Dismissal for failure to prosecute is a 
decision within the broad discretion of the trial court"). See also Wilson v. Lambert. 613 
P.2d 765, 768 (Utah, 1980). This Court has also said: "Under the comparable federal rule, 
the United States Supreme Court similarly held: 
'The authority of a court to dismiss susi sponte for lack of prosecution has 
generally been considered an 'inherent power,' governed not by rule or 
statute but by the control necessarily vested in courts to manage their own 
affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases. Link 
v.Wabash R. Co., 370 U.S. 626,630-31,82 S.Cfc 1386,1388-89, 8 L.Ed.2d 734 
(1962)7' Cf. Charlie Brown Construction, ibid. 
See also: Country Meadows Convalescent Center v. Utah Dept of Health, Division of 
Health Care Financing, 211 Utah Adv. Rep. 37, 851 P.2d 1212,1993 Utah App. Lexis 65 
(affirming dismissal for failure to prosecute based upon Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 
41(b)); Maxfield v. Rushton. 779 P.2d 237 (Ut.Ct.App.), cert, denied. 789 P.2d 33 (Utah, 
1989) (same); Grtmdman v. Williams & Peterson, 685 R2d 538 (Utah, 1984) (same); Johnson 
v. Firebrand. Inc., 571 V2d 1368 (Utah, 1977) (same); Westinghouse Eke Supply Co. v. Paul 
W. Larsen Contractor. 544 R2d $76 (Utah, 1975) (same); Maxfield v. Fishier, 538 R2d 1323 
(Utah, 1975) (same); Thompson Ditch Co. v, Jackson, 508 P.2d 528 (Utah, 1973) (same). 
Denotes "Record Evidence" and corresponding page number. 
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11. The legal effect of the Rule 41(h) involuntary dismissal of this case for failure 
to prosecute (and failure to respond to the OSC) operated, as a matter of law, to extinguish 
the very existence of the case itself, effective on and after 31 August 1990. 
12. Thus, as the entire valid "legal life" of this case is succinctly contained within 
the first eight (8) entries on the Dss&ict docket sheet, it is clear that the dismissal necessarily 
rendered any further or future filings, proceedings, or decisions in or pertaining to the case 
null and void ab initio and of no legal force force or effect 
13. While Plaintiff Anderson, in light of the fact that his attorney had been duly 
served with notice of the OSC issued on 17 July 1990, clearly could have exercised such 
diligence following that dismissal by timely refiling and prosecuting his case at any time 
thereafter (up to and including the 20 March 1993 statutory-limitation deadline for such 
filing), the plain fact remains that he did not do so, nor can it otherwise be shown or 
logically argued to the contrary. 
14. Nevertheless, despite these jurisdictional facts and applicable law ,^ nearly 
seven (7) months later on 25 March 1991, and however amazingly, instead of refiling his 
case Plaintiff Anderson simply filed a "Certificate of Readiness for Trial/' as reflected in 
the attached District docket sheet. 
15. As it is unquestionable that Plaintiff Anderson and his attorney, David Ct 
Anderson, knew or should have known that his case had been dismissed and that his 
failure to respond to the OSC of 17 July 1990 would be considered acquiescence in the 
entry of an order of dismissal without further notice, his filing of the aforesaid Certificate 
was thus a knowingly-false certification. 
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16. Approximately three (3) w e^eks later, on 16 April 1991, a bulk transfer of cases 
then-pending before the District Court involving amounts less tlian $10,000.00 was effected 
by means of a minute enfay, whereby such cases were transferred to the Salt Lake Circuit 
Court pursuant to Rule 4-108 of the UTAH CODE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION (U.CJ. A.). 
17. In apparent mistaken reliance upon the foregoing "Certificate of Readiness 
for Trial/ the court clerk was likely led to believe that this previously dismissed case was 
also then-"pending" as well, and apparently without checking further in order to ascertain 
that it had, in fact, been dismissed, proceeded to include it among the cases that were bulk 
transferred to the Circuit Court on 16 April 1991, however mistaken the clerk's reliance 
and inclusion in that regard may have been. 
18. Following that transfer, the case then laid dormant for fully another three (3) 
years and seven (7) months with no further prosecutorial action being taken by Plaintiff 
Anderson during that time whatsoever. 
19. Stanton had no reason pursue the matter further in the well-founded belief 
that the involuntary dismissal was valid, and particularly where Plaintiff Anderson had 
neither taken any further action to refile the case nor served Stanton to that effect. 
20. During that interim, however, from on and after 20 March 1993, the six (6)-
year statute of limitations governing Plaintiff Anderson's contract action expired, as the 
alleged date the contract default sued upon had occurred on 20 March 1987. 
21. Despite these additional jurisdictional bars, and again however amazingly, 
Plaintiff Anderson's counsel, Attorney David C Anderson, then proceeded nevertheless 
3
 See; Plaintiffs Complaint, R. R 1-4. 
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to draft an ex parte "ORDER (duplicate)/' dated 14 November 1994, which purported to 
"set aside" "the prior order of the court" of 31 August 1990 by which the case had long-
since been dismissed. But even if it had not been dismissed, this dilatory action was 
occasioned almost 19-1/2 months after the statute of limitations had run and fully four (4) 
years and eleven (11) months since the complaint was filed, to say notliing of the fact that 
such action clearly required a Rule 60(b) motion and notice to all parties in any event. 
22. In reliance upon the verbatim language of the minute entry of 16 April 1991 
pertaining to the bulk transfer of pending District cases to the Circuit, Attorney Anderson 
concluded his ex parte "ORDER (duplicate)" as follows: "Ordered shall be transferred to 
the Circuit Court, the costs of transfer shall be paid by the Plaintiff." Ibid. 
23. Then, even more amazingly, Attorney Anderson managed, by whatever 
means, to inveigle Judge Rigtrup to sign that self-authored ex parte "ORDER (duplicate)" 
and thereafter knowingly and willfully caused that document to be filed in the District 
Court by entry date of 14 November 1994, and thereby worked a fraud, not only upon the 
court, but upon all parties to the "case" and even the integrity of the justice system itself. 
24. All of such ill-conceived and ex parte actions by Attorney Anderson operated 
to deprive Stanton of the fundamental due-process opportunity to even be heard in the 
matter and ultimately resulted in what could only be characterized as "trial by ambush." 
25. That document was accompanied by a mailing certificate signed by one 
"Melissa Palmer" and addressed to Farr at his former home address, and to Stanton at the 
non-existent address of: "2035 East 3300 South, South Weber, Utah 84405." Moreover, the 
mailing certificate was dated "this 31 day of October, 1994," or 15 days prior to the time 
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the ex parte "ORDER (duplicate)" was signed and filed, and was thus a false certification. 
As a predictable consequence, those documents were not delivered to either Farr or 
Stanton. (A copy of those documents are attached as Exhibits 4 and 5.) 
26. As a direct and proximate result of Attorney Anderson's ex parte actons and 
untimely filing of his self-concocted and knowingly-bogus "ORDER (duplicate)/7 this 
previously-dismissed case was subsequently ordered transferred a second time, from the 
Salt Lake Circuit Court to the Murray Circuit Court. 
27. While Judge Rigtrup's inveigled signing of that bogus, ex parte "ORDER 
(duplicate)" clearly constituted an abuse of discretion, of equal if not greater importance 
is the fact that Attorney Anderson's actions in that regard directly resulted in the 
unjustified waste of judicial resources and prolonged "longevity" of this long-since-
dismissed case that continues through the present, and were carefully calculated to effect 
undue advantage to Plaintiff Anderson which was only exceeded by the undue prejudice 
effected against Stanton. As such, Attorney Anderson's tactics clearly constituted, at a 
bare minimum, an "invited error," long-since denounced by the Utah Supreme Court: 
"A party who takes a position which either leads a court into error or by 
conduct approves the error committed by the court, cannot later take 
advantage of such error in procedure...". Helman v. Peterson. 121 Utah 332, 
241 P.2d 910, 913 (1952), citing Ludlow v. Colorado Animal By-Products 
Company. 104 Utah 221,137 P.2d 347, 354 (1943). 
See also: West Gallery Corp. v. Salt Lake City Bd. o/Com'rs., 537 P.2d 1027 (Utah, 1975), 
wherein the Court so appropriately stated: "...[Tjhe suggestion of mootness on the part of 
the City is mute evidence that it has attempted to shift its own abortive procedures onto 
the shoulders of the District Court,..,". Ibid, at 1028. 
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28. The docket sheet for the Muiray Circuit Court indicates that the transfer was 
effected on or about 14 December 1994, as reflected in its first entry date which indicates 
" Filed: Complaint/' But here, again, the ''Complaint7' was merely Plaintiff Anderson's 
original complaint that had been dismissed by the District Court on 31 August 1990, more 
than four (4) years earlier, and fraudulently resurrected by his counsel in the ex parte 
manner aforesaid. (A copy of the Murray Circuit docket sheets are attached as Exhibit 6.) 
29. But even if Plaintiff Anderson had in fact filed and served a new complaint 
at the time of this second transfer, which he clearly did not, it, too, would have necessarily 
been untimely as the statute of limitations had long since expired in this case on 20 March 
1993, as previously indicated at *[ 7, above. 
30. Nevertheless, on 3 January 1995, Plaintiff Anderson, in an unconscionable 
attempt to capitalize upon the undue advantage occasioned by this ex parte means of 
invited error, filed another "Certificate of Readiness for Trial," which was ultimately 
received by Stanton sometime after 19 January 1995* 
31. Thereafter, on 24 January 1995, Stanton promptly filed a special appearance 
to challenge the Murray Court's jurisdiction of the case based, in large part, on the 
foregoing facts and properly styled in a motion to dismiss. See; e.g., We$tinghou$e Electric 
Supply Co. v. Paul W. Larson Contractor. Inc., 544 P.2d 876 (Utah, 1975) ("Rule 41(b) 
provides that: For failure of the plaintiff to prosecutef,] a defendant may move for 
dismissal of an action"). Ibid., at 877, n. 2. 
32. On 24 February 1995, the Muiray Court, in obvious reliance upon the 
presupposed validity of this transferred "pending" case, and despite the jurisdictional 
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arguments set forth in Stanton's motion to dismiss, summarily denied tlte same, merely 
stating, without more, "This court believes it has jurisdiction to allow this case to continue 
to be prosecuted/' and thus, ipse dixit, allowed the case to proceed to trial later that year. 
33. This was plain error where, since the earliest days of the Republic, courts 
have recognized that their first duty is to be certain they have jurisdiction of the cause. In 
that regard a newly-formed U. S. Supreme Court made it clear: 
"No Court in America ever yet thought, nor, I hope, ever will, of acquiring 
jurisdiction by fiction. ...It is evident that we are not to assume a voluntary 
jurisdiction, because we think, or others may think, it may be exercised 
innocently, or even wisely. Hie court is not to fix the bounds of its own 
jurisdiction, according to its own discretion, A jurisdiction assumed without 
authority, would be equally an usurpation, whether exercised wisely, or 
unwisely." Maxfield's Lessee v. Levy (I), 4 U.S. 308, 311-12 (1797). 
See also:McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 (1819) ("The principle that [a court] can 
exercise only the powers granted to it... is now universally admitted"); Cherokee Nation 
v. Georgia, 5 Peters 2 (1881) ("Before we can look into the merits of the case, a preliminary 
inquiry presents itself: Has this court jurisdiction of the cause?"); accord, Tftompson v» 
Jackson 743 R2d 1230,1232 (Ut.Ct.App., 1987) ("Even in the absence of a proper objection, 
the issue [ subject matter jurisdiction] should have been raised on the courts own motion"); 
Alfred v. AUred, 835 P.2d 974, 977 (UtCt.App,, 1992) (\..[T]he initial inquiry of any court 
should always be to determine whether the requested action is within its jurisdiction"); 
Curtis v, Curtis. 789 P.2d 717, 726 (UtCt.App., 1990) ("If a court lacks jurisdiction 'it has 
not power to entertain the suit7 (citation omitted)"); Lamarrv. Utah State Dept ofTransp.. 
828 P.2d 535, 540 (Ut.Ct.App., 1992) ("In fact, Rule 12(h)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure requires this court to dismiss the claim ... if the trial court lacked jurisdiction" 
(emphasis in original)). 
34. "When a jurisdictional question arises," as was the case here, "the burden to 
establish it rests upon the party asserting that jurisdiction." Thompson v. Jackson, supra. 
743 P.2d, at 1232. In that case, this Court further said, "Hie trial court should have 
examined its own jurisdictional limitations at the time ... and dismissed the action/' Ibid. 
To make that determination in this case the trial court had only to examine the Oder of 
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Dismissal issued on 31 August 1990, which has never been modified or rescinded. Thus, 
"...It was improper for the court to proceed in this matter other than by dismissal. Even 
in the absence of a proper objection, the issue should have been raised on the court's own 
motion. Upon its failure to raise the issue, we are obligated to do so." Id. Squarely faced 
with this evidence in Stanton's objection and motion to dismiss, as well as in his Trial 
Memorandum which the court took under advisement, it was plain error for the Murray 
Court to proceed ipse dixit and render judgment against him, and particularly wrhere 
Plaintiff Anderson also had a concomitant burden and failed to prove to the contrary. 
35. On 2 October 1995 trial was held, at which Stanton proffered and the Court 
received the aforesaid 23-page Trial Memorandum, which fully sets forth the facts and law 
pertaining to this case since its inception and running to the date of trial. See: Record 
Evidence, "Trial Memorandum/' ibid., pp. 191-213. 
36. The Court then withheld its decision as to Stanton pending its determination 
of his proffered Trial Memorandum, which it took under advisement. 
37. Incredibly, on 11 October 1995 the Court denied Stanton's jurisdictional 
arguments set forth in his Trial Memorandum and entered judgment against him. 
38. On 3 May 19%, the Murray docket reflects that the case was then transferred 
to Salt Lake. 
39. On 8 January 1997, the Murray docket reflects that the file was returned from 
Salt Lake, where it again laid dormant for another 19-1/2 months, until 16 September 1998, 
at which time Plaintiff Anderson caused a writ of garnishment to be issued against Stanton 
for the first time, and thus benefitted by the undue advantage of his invited error. 
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40. On 25 November 1998, following a series of motions by Stanton throughout 
the months of September to November, he filed his notice of appeal in this case, the 
Memorandum Decision of wltich forms the basis for this Petition for Rehearing based upon 
the lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 
41. On appeal, Plaintiff Anderson (Appellee) does not deny, nor could he, that 
the 31 August 1990 Order of Dismissal was filed, but rather, argues, "The Order of 
Dismissal entered as a result of the Order to Show Cause hearing was not served by the 
clerk on anyone/' A. 8.,4 at 19. f his argument is meritless because the OSC itself stated, 
"Failure to appear will be considered aquiescence [sic] in entry of an order of dismissal 
without further notice/' See:Meadow Fresh Farms, Inc. v. Utah State University, et al. 
1991 Utah App. Lexis 77, at 6 ("Plaintiffs claim that the order of dismissal must be vacated 
because he did not have personal notice ... is without merit"). As Appellee had clearly 
been on notice since the time the OSC was duly served upon him, he had an obligation to 
ascertain the status of the case for himself and was simply dilator}' in doing so. 
42. Faced with this inescapable fact, Appellee next resorts to a truly novel 
argument, "By the continued filings of the parties, it is a clear indication that no one 
understood the case was dismissed, including the Court, since by its Minute Entry 
transferred the case to the Circuit court April 16,1990." A. B., at 19. This argument fails 
for several reasons. First, Appellee cites no authority, nor could he, that supports his 
arbitrary legal conclusion that a valid, duly noticed and executed Rule 41(b) involuntary 
dismissal may be disturbed or upset "By the continued filings of the parties,../'. As a case 
4
 Answering Brief. 
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dismissed no longer exists, this argument is analogous to hanging wallpaper on a non-
existent wall. See: f^ [ 8-11, above. Second, such "continued filings" hardly operate to 
render "a clear indication that no one understood the case was dismissed, including the 
Court,../'. Indeed, the OSC and Order of Dismissal plainly speak for themselves. Third, 
Appellee again cites no authority, nor could he, that a "Minute Entry" transfer is legally 
sufficient to nullify a Rule 41(b) order, and particularly not as it occurred in this case. See: 
*[f^f 14-15, above. Fourth, moreover, nothing in the record indicates that such transfer 
occurred on "April 16,1990," as if to continue to mislead by inferring that the bulk transfer 
of cases transpired prior to the dismissal of this case. To the contrary, such transfer 
occurred a full year later, on 16 April 1991, or nearly eight (8) months after its dismissal. 
43. Appellee then continues to argue, "The record does not disclose why the case 
was not transferred by the District Court to the Circuit Court for some time, and only 
occurred after a duplicate order was entered on November 14,1994." A. B., at 19. In light 
of the facts set forth in f ^ 19-25, above, this argument is specious and disingenuous at best. 
44. Appellee does not argue, nor could he, the fact of the dismissal but, rather, 
"Appellant asserts that the Order of Dismissal was an adjudication on the merits, which 
is false." He then futilely concludes without proof, "The Order was entered erroneously 
by the Court." A. B., at 19. This argument is baseless where this Court has said, "The 
language in Rule 41(b) relevant to the effect of a dismissal states, "Unless the court in its 
order of dismissal otherwise specifies, a dismissal under this subdivision and any dismissal 
not provided for in this rule ... operates as an adjudication upon the merits'." Country 
Meadows Convalescent Center v. Utah Department of Health* Division of Health Care 
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Financing, 1993 Utah App. Lexis 65, at 6, n. 5. Indeed, the Order of Dismissal contains no 
such exceptions and speaks for itself. See: <|[f 7-10, above. In light of the compelling 
jurisdictional issues in this case, whether the default dismissal related to the "merits of the 
case" is irrelevant, More importantly, "The burden is on the party attacking a dismissal 
for failure to prosecute to offer a reasonable excuse for its lack of diligence." Meadow 
Fresh Fanns v. Utah State Univ., 813 R2d 1216,1218 (Ut.Ct.App., 1991). Thus, Appellee's 
arbitrary and unsupported, indeed unsupportabie, conclusion that, "The Order was 
entered erroneously by the Court," hardly rises to the level of "a reasonable excuse for its 
lack of diligence," and particularly not where Appellee failed to take any action 
whatsoever for nearly seven (7) months following entry of that dismissal, and then only 
by the mere filing of a knowingly-false "Certificate of Readiness for Trial" in this no-
longer-existent case. See: If 13. Since the entire proceedings before the Murray Court were 
conducted absent jurisdiction over five (5) years later, they are a nullity and are void. 
Thompson v. Jackson, supra, 743 P.2d, at 1232. 
CONCLUSION 
For the causes and reasons set forth herein, and to effect the ends of fundamental 
fairness and due process, this Court should grant this Petition for Rehearing of the above-
styled Appeal and it is hereby so moved. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS 6TH DAY OF JANUARY 2000. 
W^t, X 
Daniel A. Stanton a/x/a D. Aron Stanton 
JDefe^d^nt/ Appellant/ Petitioner 
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David C. Anderson 
505 East 200 South, Suite 400 
First Federal Plaza 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102. 
&p£U-„. • {wit' 
"Daniel A. Stanton a/Ik/a D. Arbn Stanton 
Defendant/ Appellant Pro Se 
TiC-J-h <L rrL 46 FM ruu 1 i :A,E 7 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT - SLC 
D O C K E T 
Case...,..: 890907678 CN Contracts 
Case Title; 
ANDERSON, DALE VS FARR, ROBERT S 
Page 
WEDNESDAY MARCH 1, 19$ 
10:17 } 
Filing Date: 12/22/8 
Judge: KENNETH RIGTRUP 
Party.. 
Name... 
ATP Atty for Plaintiff 
Work Phone.: (3C1) 533-9400 
ANDERSON, DAVID C, 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
505 EAST 200 SOUTH 
SUITE 400 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 841020000 
Case filed on 12/22/89 =-> Contracts vj 
COMPLAINT VJ 
892450162 Civil filing fee received 75.00 VJ 
FILED: SUMMONS ON RETURN SERVED ROBERT S FARR JK 
FILED: ANSWER JK 
FILED: NOTICE OF CHANGE OF ADDRESS (ATP) CL 
FILED: LETTER FROM ARON STANTON CL 
Order to Show Cause - No. 1 JK 
OSC scheduled for 08/24/90 at 0830 A in room L with KR JK 
Order of Dismissal - Reason: CU 
Order to Show Cause by Court CU 
Case judgment is Dismissed CU 
case disposition is Dismissed CU 
12/22/89 
I 01/25/90 
01/31/90 
I 02/05/90 
I 02/09/90 
07/17/90 
I 08/24/90 
I 
08/31/^0 
FILED: WITHDRAWAL OF COUNSEL (FRANK S WARNER) 
09/04/90 FILED: NOTICE TO APPOINT COUNSEL 
BL 
"J* 
03/25/91 
04/16/91 
I 05/06/91 
I 
11/14/94 
I 
I 
FILED: RENEWAL OF OBJECTION TO REPRESENTATION JK 
FILED: CERTIFICATE OF READINESS FOR TRIAL SL 
FILED: MINUTE ENTRY - PURSUANT TO RULE 4-108, UT CODE OF CU 
JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, THIS CASE IS ORDERED TRANSFERRED CU 
TO THE CIRCUIT COURT AS THE SUMS CLAIMED HEREIN ARE LESS CU 
THAN $10,000.00, EXCLUSIVE OF COURT COSTS. THE COSTS OF CU 
TRANSFER SHALL BE PAID BY PLAINTIFF. CU 
Case judgment is Transferred CU 
Case disposition is closed CU 
FILED: LETTER OF WITHDRAWAN COUNSEL FOR DEF TO REMOVE COUNSEL Kl 
FROM OUR NOTICE KL 
Accepted distribution CE $ 2.00 from Misc. Payments screen CU 
Accepted distribution CF $ l.oo from Misc. Payments screen CU 
FILED: ORDER (DUPLICATE) - SIGNED KR (TRANSFERRED TO CIRCUIT KA 
COURT) KA 
End of the docket report for this case. 
7 - 5 $ FR! "'2:46 FV U CF 'J FQL HCS? J I V . AA . ». '
 4 / v 3 Z ' Z > FAGE E 
SALT LA33 C07X7Y, STATE Or UTA." 
ANDERSON, DALS 
P l a i n t i f f ( s ) . 
vs. 
FA3»# P.0B2RT S, e t a l . 
Defendant:(a) . 
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE NO. 
CIVIL NO. 890907678 CN 
HON. KENNETH RIGTRUP 
On it's own motion, the Court orders the parties in this 
case appear before the Court on: Friday, 08/24/90 at 08:30 AM, 
ar.d show cause why this case should not be dismissed for 
failure to prosecute. 
Failure to appear will be considered acquiescence in entry 
of an order of dismissal without further notice. 
Dated this 17th day of CTuly, /)/:. _,JT) /y^yt-
_J 0 ¥ 
XZNXE7K 3.1CTRrJ? 
DISTRICT Jl'DGS 
I cart ify that on Tj/jf/Z* I mailed a copy of the 
order to shov cause to: 
SEE A T T A C H M E N T 
/i—J&«^-/?~JUe 
OSPVTY C1SRK 
Jit-17-99 rn. ,7:47 rM ., Cr I: r l^ riUr.r J.v ^AA:.V-::O:,: 7? ml : 
A T T A C H x s y ? 
ANDERSON, DAVID C. WAR3ZR, FRANK S 
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF ATTORNEY FOR DEFEKDANT 
311 SOUTH STATE STREET 50S 27TH STREET 
SUITE 380 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111 OGDEN UT B4401 
DE'J-1-99 FR! ^2:47 ?vi ::v un hucr J A' PAGE 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ANDERSON, DALE 
Plaintiff(s). 
VS. 
FARR, ROBERT S, et al. 
Defendant(s). 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
CIVIL NO. 89C907678 CN 
HON. KENNETH RIGTRUP 
The Court having ordered the parties in this case appear 
on August 24, 1990 and show cause why the case should not be 
dismissed for failure to prosecute, and the parties having 
failed to appear, IT IS ORDERED, that tnis case is dismissed 
without prejudice. 
Dated this 31th day of August, 1990. 
BY THE COURT 
KfiKNETK RIGTRt 
DISTRICT JUDGE-4" 
~^«r icv THAT THIS IS A T W € COP* Of M* 
\ CEFT1FY JHAT \ riK> w
 w £ ^ ^ 
DEPUTY (SOURT C l B W 
DAVID C. ANDERSON, #82 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
"Washington Federal Saving Building 
505 East 2nd South, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
(801)533-9400 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DALE ANDERSON 
Plaintiff, 
ROBERT S.FARR and 
D ARONSTANTON 
Defendant. 
ORDER (duplicate) 
9y# d/w Y 
Civil No. 890907678 CN 
Judge: Kenneth Rigtrup 
Pursuant to Rule 4-108 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration, based upon the 
amount in controversy is less than $10,000, and it further appearing from the record that as 
requested by one of the defendants, D. Axon Stanton, prior to the last hearing, that his prior 
counsel did withdraw, a notice to appoint counsel having been served, the prior order of the court 
is set aside and the case his hereby 
v. ',?0 
C"_r'jfV * .ir.rt 
'.".OCT /.' 
1 
*•» "^ /"N A "7 f'\'m\ T <-, T - / yt /-« r- w 
JiC-l7-9^ .M:u • z:4d r.« ?OL H:) :? D:V FAX.S: .5S^2729 r Av;2 i , 
Ordered shall be transferred to the Circuit Court, the costs of transfer shall be paid by the 
Plaintiff 
Dated this/£«3y o f / ^ ^ j f e ^ ! 9 9 4 
^erttfethRigtrup, {/ 
District Judge 
DOCUME^ONR£'NiHt 
• COURT, SALT LAKt w 
9 9 :K\ ; ' 2 : 4 : ?V. ii OF "J ?OL HOS? J ; V FA)(:S: . ; 3 : 2 7 2 9 FAC-H 
. J 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the ORDER (Dupticate), postage 
prepaid this 31 day of October, 1994 to the following: 
Aron Stanton 
2035 East 3300 South 
South Weber, Utah 84405 
Robert S. Fair 
1885 East 700 South, Suite 314 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
i/j/ifrcs -fi 
:)SC-;7-99 FR; 02:43 ?« r.v.o: FAX:o J.SZr;L:-L1 ."AGE ;4 
CASE NUMBER 940013022 (Civil} 
Amount Due: 
Amount Paid: 
Amount Credit: 
Balance: 
BAIL/CASK 30ND DETAIL - TiTPE 
Posted By 
Posted 
Forfeited 
Refunded 
Balance 
190.00 
190.00 
0.00 
0.00 
BAIL 
D ARON STANTON 
300.00 
0.00 
0.00 
300.00 
CASE NOTE 
PROCEEDINGS 
12-14 
12-14 
12-14 
12-15 
01-03 
01-03 
01-03 
01-17 
01-17 
01-19 
01-19 
01-19 
01-24 
01-24 
01-24 
01-24 
01-24 
01-26 
02-06 
02-06 
02-17 
02-21 
02-21 
02-24-
02-24-
02-24-
02-24-
02-27-
02-27 
02-27 
02-27 
vonamae 
vonamae 
vonamae 
vonamae 
vonamae 
vonamae 
-94 Filed: Complaint 
-94 Judge MURRAY JUDGE assigned. convert 
-94 FILED: ORDER AND TRANSFER FROM SLC OLD #940014634 jamiep 
-94 Began tracking Return Date Review on 06/14/95jamiep 
-95 FILED: NOTICE OF CHANGE OF ADDRESS OF DAVID C ANDERSON, ATP, vonamae 
-95 505 EAST 2ND SO., SUITE 400, SLC, UT 84102 
-95 FILED: CERTIFICATE OF READINESS FOR TRIAL 
-95 FILED: DEFT STANTON COPY OF TRIAL NOTICE ON RETURN - UNDERLIV- vonamae 
-95 ERED vonamae 
-95 FILED: DEFT FARR COPY OF TRIAL NOTICE UNDELIVERED - MOVED -
-95 FORWARDING ORDER EXPIRED 
-95 REMAILED NOTICE TO STANTON AT MURRAY ADDRESS GIVEN ME BY ATP 
-95 ENTERED DECISION: REQUEST FOR CONTINUANCE GRANTED 
-95 FILED: SPECIAL APPEARANCE TO CHALLENGE JURISDICTION I.E. COURT'vonamae 
-95 S PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER D ARON STANTON; COURT'S SU3JECT MATvonamae 
-95 TER JURISDICTION OF CASE AND MOTION TO DISMISS W/O NOTICE vonamae 
-95 FILED: MOTION FOR CONTINUANCE OF TRIAL vonamae 
-95 Bench Trial scheduled on February 27, 1995 at 09:00 AM in Room 
1C2 with Judge MURRAY JUDGE. 
-95 FILED: PLAINTIFF MEMO IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO DISMISS AND 
-95 OTHER MATTERS 
-95 FILED: NOTICE TO SUBMIT 
-95 FILED: DEFT D ARON STANTON REPLY TO OPPOSITION TO MC TO DIS-
-95 MISS 
-95 ENTERED DECISION: DEFT MOTION TO DISMISS DENIED - THIS COURT 
-95 3ELIEVE IT HAS JURISDICTION TO ALLOW THIS CASE TO CONTINUE TO BEvonamae 
-95 PROSECUTED - MKS vonamae 
•95 ALL PARTIES NOTIFIED vonamae 
-95 95-87(0821) D ROTH/CRB ATP PRESENT. ARON STANTON, ATTORNEY AT carolyr 
-95 LAW, PRESENT IN HIS OWN BEHALF. (089C) DEFT MOTIONS FOR CON- carolyr 
-95 TINUANCE AND/OR RECONSIDERATION. (0950) PLAINTIFF RESPONDS. carolyr 
-95 (1100) DEFENSE RESPONDS. (124 0) COURT GRANTS MOTION FOR CONT- carolyr 
vonamae 
vonamae 
vonamae 
vonamae 
vonamae 
vonamae 
vonamae 
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CASS NUMBER 940013 022 {Civil} 
02-27-95 INUANCE. carolyr 
03-17-95 FILED: DEFT MOTION TO STAY PROCEEDINGS vonama* 
03-21-95 SIGNED ORDER DENYING DEFT MOTION TO DISMISS AND RELATED MATTER vonamae 
03-21-95 MKB vonamae 
03-22-95 SIGNED ORDER PERMITTING CONTINUANCE AND FILING CROSS CLAIM - MKBvotiamae 
03-22-95 FILED: PLA'S RESPONSE TO DEF STANTON'S MOTION TO STAY ellens 
03-22-95 PROCEEDINGS. ellens 
03-29-95 FILED: REPLY TO PLA'S RESPONSE TO DEF STANTON'S MOTION TO STAY ellens 
03-29-95 PROCEEDINGS. ellens 
04-17-95 FILED: NOTICE TO SUBMIT vonamae 
06-13-95 Ended cracking of Return Date vonamae 
06-13-95 Began tracking Appeal Review on l2/l3/95vonamae 
06-14-95 ENTERED DECISION: HEARING NEEDED - MKB vonamae 
07-18-95 FILED; REQUEST TO SUBMIT FOR DECISION vonamae 
07-20-95 HEARING REQUIRED vonamae 
07-31-95 HEARING scheduled or. August 16, 1995 at 10:30 AM in Room 102 
with Judge MURRAY JUDGE. vonamae 
08-03-95 Ended tracking of Appeal vonamae 
08-03-95 Began tracking Community Service Review on 02/03/96vonamae 
08-16-95 95-365(2201) TFC/CRB DAVID ANDERSON APPEARING IN HIS OWN carolyr 
08-16-95 BEHALF. ARON STANTON APPEARING IN HIS OWN BEHALF. EACH PARTY carolyr 
08-16-95 MAKES STATEMENTS. COURT ORDERS CASE BE SET FOR TRIAL. carolyr 
08-17-95 Bench Trial scheduled on October 02, 1995 at 01:30 PM in Room 
102 with Judge MURRAY JUDGE. vonamae 
08-18-95 FILED: DEFT FARR COPY OF HEARING NOTICE UNDELIVERED - REFUSED vonamae 
08-22-95 FILED: DEFT FARR COPY OF HEARING NOTICE UNDELIVERED FORWARDING vonamae 
03-22-95 ORDER EXPIRED vonamae 
08-29-95 Fee Account created Total Due: 60.00 convert 
08-29-95 COMPLAINT-NO AMT SPC Payment Received: 60.00 jamiep 
Note: FEE CROSS CLAIM 
08-29-95 FILED: CROSS CLAIM vonamae 
03-3 0-95 SIGNED ORDER DENYING DEFT MOTION TO STAY PROCEEDINGS - TPC vonamae 
10-02-95 95-446<0558) TPC/CRB DAVID ANDERSON APPEARING ON BEHALF OF THEcarolyr 
10-02-95 PLTF. ARON STANTON, ATTORNEY AT LAW, APPEARING ON HIS OWN BE- carolyr 
10-02-95 HALF. ROBERT S. FARR FTA. (0698) PLTFS #1 WITNESS: DALE L. carolyr. 
10-02-95 ANDERSON, PLTF, SWORN AND EXAMINED IN HIS OWN BEHALF. carolyr 
10-02-95 EVIDENCE OFFERED AND RECEIVED. (1660) DEFENSE CROSS-EXAMS. carolyr 
10-02-95 (2732) PLTFS #2 WITNESS: DANIEL A STANTON, DEFT, SW & EXAM IN carolyr 
10-02-95 HIS OWN BEHALF. TAPE CHANGE 95-447. PARTIES PROPHER ATTORNEY carolyr 
10-02-95 FEES. PLTF MAKES CLOSING ARGUMENTS. (0312) DEFENSE MAKES carolyr 
10-02-95 CLOSING ARGUMENTS. COURT GRANTS JUDGMENT TO PLTF AS TO ROBERT carolyr. 
10-02-95 S. FARR AS PRAYED. COURT TAKES UNDER ADVISEMENT AS TO ARON carolyr 
10-02-95 STANTON. carolyr 
10-11-95 THE COURT HAVING TAKEN UNDER ADVISEMENT AND BEING FULLY ADVISED carolyr 
10-11-95 FINDS: carolyr 
10-11-95 1. PRINCIPEL AND INTEREST THROUGH 10/2/95 $10,480.89 carolyr 
10-11-95 2. REIMBURSEMENT FOR INSURANCE 164.85 carolyr 
10-11-95 3. DISHONORED CHECK CHARGES 80.00 carolyr 
10-11-95 carolyr 
Printed: 11/25/98 13:14:44 Page 3 
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CASE NUMBER 940013022 {Civil} 
10-11-95 $10,725.74 carolyr. 
10-11-95 2. AS A PARTY TO THE CONTRACT DEFENDANT STANTON IS LIABLE FOR carolyr. 
10-11-95 THE CONTRACT AMOUNTS AND DISHONORED CHECK CHARGES INCURRED BY carolyr. 
10-11-95 HIS PARTNER AS WELL AS ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS. carolyr. 
10-11-95 3. PLAINTIFF HAS FAILED TO PROVE THAT DEFENDANT STANTON EVER carolyr 
10-11-95 PROMISED TO PAY ANY AMOUNT AS PRE-CONTRACT INTEREST. THE CON- carolyr. 
10-11-95 TRACT CONTAINS A PROMISE TO NEGOTIATE WITH RESPECT TO THOSE carolyr. 
10-11-95 AMOUNTS. PLAINTIFF HAS PROVEN THAT DEFENDANT FARR IS OBLIGATED carolyr. 
10-11-95 TO HIM FOR THE PRE-CONTRACT INTEREST IN THE AMOUNT OF $1,080.00.Carolyn 
10-11-95 4. THE DEFENSE OF LACHES IS UNAVAILABLE TO DEFENDANT STANTON carolyr. 
10-11-95 EECAUSE HE COULD, AS EASILY AS PLAINTIFF, HAVE PROTECTED HIMSELFcarolyr. 
10-11-95 BY PROCEEDING TO SECURE THE COLLATERAL AND ANY LOSS RESULTING carolyr. 
10-11-95 FROM PLAINTIFF'S DELAY IN BRINGING THIS MATTER TO TRIAL IS carolyr. 
10-11-95 EQUALLY ATTRIBUTABLE TO DEFENDANT'S NEGLECT. carolyr. 
10-11-95 5. PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO AN ORDER PERMITTING HIM TO PROCEED Carolyn 
10-11-
10-11-
10-11-
10-11-
10-11-
10-11-
10-11-
10-11-
10-16-
10-16-
10-16-
10-20-
10-26-
10-30-
11-01-
11-03-
11-03-
11-14-
95 AGAINST THE COLLATERAL AS PROVIDED IN THE UCC TO THE EXTENT KE 
95 IS ABLE TO DO SO GIVEN DEFENDANT FARR'S APPARENT ACTIONS IN 
95 TRANSFERRING THE COLLATERAL TO A THIRD PARTY, 
95 6. PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO RECOVER ATTORNEYS' FEES AGAINST 
95 BOTH PARTIES IN THE AMOUNT OF S1506.50, PLUS COSTS TO BE TAXED 
95 PURSUANT TO THE RULES. 
95 7. PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL IS TO PREPARE FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLU 
95 SIONS OF LAW AND JUDGMENT CONSISTENT HEREWITH. 
95 EXHIBITS PLACED IN EVIDENCE LOCKER. 
95 Began tracking Exhibit 
carolyn 
carolyn 
carolyn 
carolyn 
carolyn 
carolyn 
carolyn 
carolyn 
lindav 
Review on l2/30/95lindav 
95 FILED: PLA RESPONSE MEMO TO THE TRIAL MEMO vonamae 
95 FILED: REQUEST FOR DECISION vonamae 
95 REQUESTED TAPES 95-446 AND 95-447 FOR DAN STANTON deem 
95 FILED: REPLY MEMO IN OPPOSITION TO PLA MEMORANDUM OF 10-12-95 vonamae 
95 RECEIVED TAPES 95-446 AND 95-447 BACK deem 
95 FILED: DEFT NOTICE OF OBJECTIONS TO PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT, vonamae 
95 CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND JUDGMENT vonamae 
95 Judgment: #1 Entered 
Note: AGREEMENT 
11,805.74 
11,805.74 Judgment Grand Total 
11-14-95 Case judgment is Trial Judgment vonamae 
11-14-95 Case removed from TRACKING vonamae 
11-14-95 SIGNED FINDINGS OF FACT & CONCLUSIONS OF LAW vonamae 
11-14-95 SIGNED JUDGMENT - $11805."74 - TPC vonamae 
11-15-95 ENTERED JUDGMENT - CLERK VJD vonamae 
12-13-95 FILED: NOTICE TO SUBMIT vonamae 
01-12-96 FILED: NOTICE OF CHANGE OF ADDRESS - STANTON vonamae 
05-03-96 CASE TRANSFERRED TO JUDGE RIGTRUP'S COURT donnas 
12-06-96 EVIDENCE DISTROYED bonnies 
12-06-96 Ended tracking of Exhibit bonnies 
01-08-97 FILE RETURNED FROM SALT LAKE vonamae 
09-16-98 Fee Account created Total Due: 20.00 hoilyk 
09-16-98 Issued: Garnishment hoilyk 
Printed: 11/25/98 13:14:44 Page 4 
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CAS*I NUMBER 940013C22 { C i v i l } 
09-16 
09-18 
09-18 
09-21 
09-23 
Payment Received: 20.00 -98 GARNISHMENT 
Note: Mail Payment 
•98 Filed: Request for Hearing--Garn, 
-98 Filed: Def e Objection to writ of Gam. and Motion for Dismissal 
w/o Notice to Submit. 
•98 Filed: Answer gam without check 
ROBERT S FARR 
September 17, 1998 ' 
-98 Notice - NOTICE for Case 940013022 ID 528545 
LAW & MOTION is scheduled. 
Date; 10/08/1998 
Time: 10:30 a.m. 
Location: Room 102 
MURRAY CIRCUIT COURT 
5022 SOUTH STATE STREET 
MURRAY, UT 84107 
'98 LAW & MOTION scheduled on. October C8, 1993 at 10:30 AM in Room 
102 with Judge FRATTO. 
hollyk 
ellens 
ellens 
tamrav 
vonamae 
vonamae 
carol1 
vonamae 
hollye 
tamrav 
vonamae 
09-23 
09-23-98 Filed: Supplemental Response to Objection to Writ of Garnishment 
(time line) 
09-23-98 Filed: Filed: request for oral argument 
09-24-98 Filed: Garn on return. 
10-01-98 Filed: Answer garn without check 
ROBERT S FARR 
243.51 
September 24, 1998 
10-08-98 Filed: Nocice of Change of Address of Atty David C Anderson 
10-08-98 Filed: Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's objection to writ of 
garnishment and other matters vonamae 
10-08-98 Fee Account created Total Due: 5.00 cristt 
10-08-98 AUDIO TAPE COPY Payment Received: 5.00 cristt 
10-08-98 Minute Entry - Minutes for HEARING bonniel 
Judge: MURRAY MURRAY JUDGE 
Clerk; bonniel 
PRESENT 
Defendant(s): D ARON STANTON 
Plaintiff's Attorney(s): DAVID C. ANDERSON 
Audio 
Tape Number: 98-611 Tape Count: 2520 
HEARING 
Court 
Pltf to 
TIME: 10:53 AM Parties argue motion on the garnishment 
denies motion to dismiss and motion to quash garnishment, 
prepare and submit to the court. 
10-15-98 Filed: Deft notice of hearing returned from 1885 E 700 S, Suite 
Printed: 11/25/98 13:14:46 Page 5 
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CASE NUMBER 940013022 {Civil} 
314, SLC, UT 84105 attempted - not known 
10-15-98 Piled: Answer gam without check 
ROBERT S FARR 
262.39 
October 08, 1998 
10-21-98 Filed: D. Arcn Stanton notice of hearing returned - undelivered 
attempted, not known 
10-29-98 Filed order: Signed order denying defendant Stanton's objection 
to writ of garnishment and denying motion to dismiss - jcf 
Judge j fratto 
Signed October 28, 1998 
Garn affidavit w/out check $245.65 ok 
Gam Answer On Return W/O Check $236.56 
Garn Answer On Return W/O Check $236.56 
Garn Answer On Return W/O Check $236.56 
Garn Answer On Return W/O Check $236.56 
vonamae 
tamrav 
10-30 
11-16 
11-16 
11-16 
11-16 
11-25 
11-25 
11-25 
11-25 
11-25 
11-25 
11-25 
Filed: 
Filed: 
Filed: 
Filed: 
Filed: 
-98 
-98 
-98 
-98 
-98 
-98 Bail Account created 
-98 
-96 
-98 
Total Due: 
Payment Received: 
300 
OK 
OK 
OK920010200 
OK 
.00 
300.00 Bail Posted 
Filed: Notice of Appeal 
Fee Account created Total Due: 190.00 
•98 APPEAL Payment Received: 190.00 
Note: Code Description: APPEAL 
•98 Filed: Notice of appeal of records on 10/29/98 
•98 Filed: Notice of change of address of Daniel A Stanton to 1016 
East 900 So #5, SLC Ut 84105 Phone 801-521-3514 
vonamae 
vonamae 
maryl 
gailj 
gailj 
gailj 
gailj 
hollyk 
hollyk 
hollyk 
hollyk 
hollyk 
hollyk 
hollyk 
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